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I. INTRODUCTION
Do you expect your government to treat you equally? More importantly,
do you expect your government to treat your children equally in the context
of education? If your child has an emotional or behavioral disability, does
this entitle the state to segregate your child away from other students,
providing him or her with an education that is unequal in comparison to
general education? Children and young adults with behavioral and
emotional disabilities are entitled to education that is equivalent to the
education other students receive. It is important to examine local systems of
education to ensure that students with disabilities are being treated equally.
On August 23, 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice filed suit against the
State of Georgia, a constituent state of the United States. The complaint in
the suit, captioned United States v. Georgia, targeted the Georgia Network
for Educational and Therapeutic Support (GNETS), a state funded program
that provides education to students with emotional and behavioral
disabilities. It alleged GNETS impermissibly segregates and discriminates
against students with behavioral and emotional disabilities.1
The case stems from an incident in 2004, when a thirteen-year-old boy,
Jonathan King, hanged himself in an isolation room in a GNETS facility. An
investigation was launched.2 The Department of Justice decided to file a
civil action after federal-state negotiations failed. In the complaint, the
United States alleged that the manner in which GNETS is currently being
administered is a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
because it unnecessarily segregates students with disabilities from their
peers.3
What does the United Nations Human Rights Committee think about
segregating schoolchildren with disabilities in a manner that makes their
education unequal to the education of other students? The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4 is considered by many to be the
leading authority on human rights standards in the international sphere.5
What does this mean for the problem at hand? The Covenant sets forth
obligations that must be followed by the party states. The United States

1
Complaint, United States v. Georgia, No. 1:16-CV-03088 (N.D. Ga. filed Aug. 23, 2016),
https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/gnets_complaint.html.
2
King v. Pioneer Reg’l Educ. Serv. Agency, 688 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
3
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
4
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
5
MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS CCPR COMMENTARY,
at XVII (1993).
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ratified the Covenant in 1992, which means that U.S. practices and
procedures must meet the Covenant’s human rights standards, including its
standards in the education of children with disabilities.
This Note aims to provide a deeper understanding of the current lawsuit
between the United States and the State of Georgia and the applicability of
international law to the problem. By analyzing the applicable provisions of
the Covenant and its jurisprudence, this Note explores whether GNETS
practices are discriminatory under international law standards. Part II of this
Note will discuss the recent complaint that has been filed and the factual
findings that were made by the DOJ in its 2015 investigation report. Part III
will provide an overview of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the specific provisions that are applicable to the problem, and the
status of the Covenant in the United States. Part IV provides an analysis of
the manner in which the practices of GNETS violates international law
standards and a discussion of the scope and limits of the Covenant in the
United States.
II. SEGREGATIONIST PRACTICES AS A CASE STUDY IN U.S. LAW ON
SCHOOLCHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES
The United States filed a civil action against the State of Georgia. The
United States alleged that Georgia’s GNETS Program is a violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act because it unnecessarily segregates students
with disabilities from their peers and provides them with unequal
opportunities compared to those provided to students who are not in the
program.6
A. State Practices Followed in GNETS, the Georgia Network for
Educational and Therapeutic Support
The Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic Support (GNETS)
consists of twenty-four state-funded programs throughout the State of
Georgia that provide comprehensive and therapeutic support to students with
disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-one.7 In the United States’
Complaint, GNETS is described as a program that the State, through the
6
GNETS Letter of Findings from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to
Nathan Deal, Governor of Ga., and Sam Olens, Attorney Gen. of Ga., at 1 (July 15, 2015),
https:// www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/gnets_lof.pdf.
7
Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic Support (GNETS), GA. DEP’T OF
EDUC. (2015), https://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-Instruction-and-Assessment/Special-Educa
tion-Services/Pages/Georgia-Network-for-Special-Education-and-Supports.aspx.
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Georgia Department of Education, “plans, funds, administers, licenses,
manages, and oversees,” and it determines which mental health and
therapeutic services will be provided, who will provide them, what settings
they will be provided in, and how to allocate state and federal funds.8
Students in the program have one or more of the severe characteristics within
the disability category of emotional and behavioral disorders.9 Local schools
throughout the state refer students to receive services from GNETS through
the Individual Education Program, a process that evaluates students’
emotional and behavioral disorders based on the severity, frequency, and
duration of the disorder.10 The State sets not only the criteria for students’
eligibility but also the entry and exit standards.11 Even though many of these
students could be educated in an environment that is more integrated with
other students, the State has chosen to provide services for students with
behavioral-related disabilities almost exclusively in a segregated GNETS
center or classroom.12
The U.S. Department of Justice launched an investigation into Georgia
after Jonathan King hanged himself at the Alpine center located in
Gainesville, Georgia in 2004.13 The media attention that surrounded the
incident, coupled with a lawsuit that the child’s parents filed against the
Georgia Department of Education (DOE), prompted the federal
investigation.14 Following a Georgia trial court’s grant of the DOE’s motion
for summary judgment, the parents appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals
on grounds that “questions of material fact remain as to whether the Pioneer
RESA [local school system managing Alpine] violated Jonathan’s
substantive due process rights and further arguing that their claims against
DOE were not barred by sovereign immunity.”15 In a unanimous decision
issued in 2009, a three-member panel of the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that there was not a substantive due process violation because there was no
evidence that the two school employees who placed Jonathan in the seclusion
room had acted with deliberate indifference; in particular, the court
8

Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 5.
Id.
10
Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
11
Id. ¶ 5.
12
Id.
13
See Alan Judd, Georgia ‘Psychoeducation’ Case Gets Outside Lawyer, ATL.- J. CONST.
NEWS (May 4, 2014), http://investigations.blog.ajc.com/2015/12/18/state-hires-lawyer-to-han
dle-psychoeducation-case/; see also Alan Judd, Death Highlights Lack of Regulation at
Georgia’s ‘Psychoeducational’ Schools, ATL.-J. CONST. NEWS (July 27, 2009), http://www.ajc.
com/news/news/local/death-highlights-lack-of-regulation-at-psychoeduca/nQJKQ/.
14
King v. Pioneer Reg’l Educ. Serv. Agency, 688 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
15
Id. at 10.
9
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concluded that these employees were not aware that Jonathan had threatened
suicide weeks prior.16
In July 2015, the United States Department of Justice issued a “letter of
findings” addressed to Georgia’s governor and attorney general, outlining the
results of their investigation into GNETS.17 The letter also laid out the legal
conclusions and minimum steps that it said Georgia was required to take in
order to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA).18 The
U.S. Department of Justice letter concluded that the manner in which
GNETS is administered has resulted and continues to result in segregation
and discriminatory practices because students with disabilities are
unnecessarily segregated from their peers and are not given opportunities
equal to those available to other students.19
The Department of Justice based its conclusion on a number of factors
outlined in the letter. First, the letter concluded that the State of Georgia
failed to provide services to students that have been placed in GNETS in the
most integrated setting possible to meet each student’s needs.20 Twothirds—3,100—of GNETS students attend school in a completely segregated
and isolated setting that has provided students with little to no interaction
with other students who are in general education school buildings.21
Generally, the GNETS buildings are separate, run-down buildings located at
a distance away from general education buildings.22 The GNETS centers
that are situated in general education schools are either in separate wings of
the school with separate entrances or in the school’s basement.23 The State
incentivized general education schools to rely on GNETS to provide
education for students with behavioral-related disabilities so local schools
did not have to provide and fund the services that these students required in
an integrated setting.24 This resulted in many students receiving poorer
quality services than those received by students in general education
schools.25 It is the State’s responsibility to ensure that these students receive
the behavioral and therapeutic services that they require in the most
integrated setting possible, but the structure and manner in which the State
has operated GNETS base decisions on factors, such as geography and the
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Id. at 15.
GNETS Letter of Findings, supra note 6, at 1.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 8, 10.
Id. at 10.
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availability of services, instead of on the individualized needs of each
student.26
Second, the letter concluded that GNETS provides unequal educational
opportunities to students in comparison to those provided to the general
education student population.27 Many GNETS students only have the
opportunity to learn core subjects (i.e., math, science, reading, writing) and
are provided no opportunity to learn extra-curricular subjects (i.e., “art,
music, foreign language, vocational courses . . .”) that are commonly
provided to general education students.28 GNETS students are also excluded
from general education school events like sport events, dances, and other
social events that contribute to emotional and social education and
development.29 Further, the learning environments of GNETS are not equal
to that of general education schools. Many GNETS buildings are older and
lack effective air conditioning, proper light, and extra-curricular facilities
like science labs, playgrounds, libraries, media centers, and physical
educations rooms.30 Additionally, the majority of the classrooms do not
allow for sufficient grade-level instruction because the classes are taught
with multiple-grade levels in a single classroom where each student
possesses a different type and level of disability.31 GNETS classrooms do
not foster the development of student-teacher relationships because most
instruction comes from computer-based lessons.32 These computer lessons
also fail to provide proper educational stimulation.33 Thus, as the letter
stated, the goal and aims of the GNETS are admirable in that the program
purports to provide for the educational and therapeutic needs of students with
disabilities and to fill a gap that existed in education since the 1970s.34
While these are the stated aims, the manner in which the State is currently
administering the program does not meet such goals.
The Department of Justice concluded that the State can “redirect existing
services, resources, training, and financial and human capital to appropriately
integrate students with disabilities in the GNETS into general education
schools and offer them full and equal opportunities to participate in the

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 10–12.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Georgia Network for Educ. And Therapeutic Support (GNETS), supra note 7.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

722

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

5/11/2018 5:45 PM

[Vol. 46:715

electives, extracurricular activities, coursework, and other educational
benefits and services enjoyed by their peers.”35
Negotiations between Georgia and federal government officials failed.
As a result, the United States initiated a civil action against Georgia for its
non-compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act.
B. The Department of Justice Sues the State of Georgia for Non-Compliance
After the investigation, the United States filed a civil suit against the State
of Georgia in the U.S. Court for the Northern District of Georgia on August
23, 2016.36 The United States alleged that the complete segregation, lack of
opportunities for extracurricular activities, and unequal educational settings
for students in GNETS is a violation of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.37 Title II focuses on public services of the state and local
governments and prohibits discrimination by “public entities.”38 The
complaint alleged that GNETS violates Title II of the Act because it
unnecessarily segregates and discriminates against students with disabilities
who could be taught in a general education setting.39 The United States said
that the requirement of integrating students with disabilities comes from the
community integration mandate provision in the ADA.40 In the 1999 U.S.
Supreme Court case Olmstead v. L.C., the Court held that states must make
services available to people with disabilities, including children with
disabilities, in the most integrated setting possible.41
Many of the factual allegations stated in the complaint mirror the details
of the “letter of findings.” First, the complaint asserted that GNETS’s
educational centers are institutionalized segregated settings.42 These students
are either segregated in GNETS self-contained buildings located at a distance
from general education schools or in GNETS classrooms located in separate
wings or isolated parts of the schools. As a result, students in the program
35

GNETS Letter of Findings, supra note 6, at 18.
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
37
Id.
38
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (1990).
39
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
40
Id. (“This segregation is unnecessary for the vast majority of students and, therefore,
violates Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which prohibits unnecessary
segregation of persons with disabilities in state programs, services, and activities. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131–12134. Such unjustified isolation and segregation of persons with disabilities
violates the ADA’s mandate that public entities ‘administer services, programs, and activities
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with
disabilities.’ ”); see also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
41
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
42
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
36
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are not provided with the opportunity to benefit from the range of possible
interactions that would be available in a general education school.43
Second, the complaint states that it is the manner in which the GNETS
services are provided that has caused the unnecessary segregation in the
centers and classrooms.44 The State has done this through its conduct. For
example, it has failed to provide sufficient funding for integrated services,
failed to provide general education teachers with adequate training regarding
students with behavioral-related disabilities, and used exit and entrance
criteria that effectively screened out students with disabilities from integrated
settings.45
Third, the complaint alleged that there are students with behavioralrelated disabilities in GNETS who are qualified to receive services in a more
integrated setting.46 Some students received mental health and therapeutic
educational services in an integrated setting but the number was low, and the
services available were relatively limited.47 The majority of students in
GNETS would be able to participate in integrated, general education schools,
the complaint alleged, if the State were to undertake what the complaint
terms “reasonable” modifications of its methods of education for these
children.48
Fourth, the complaint alleged that the State failed to offer students in the
GNETS Program equal opportunities to participate in electives,
extracurricular activities, and general educational opportunities.49 The
typical GNETS classroom is conducted with computer-based instruction,
which stands in contrast to general education instruction that consists of a
certified teacher for each subject area.50 GNETS students do not have the
ability to participate in electives, extracurricular activities, or after-school
athletic programs within the GNETS Program or with their “home school,”
the original public school the child attended.51 Additionally, many of the
buildings in which the GNETS Centers are located are inferior facilities in
comparison to the general education buildings; these buildings often lack
various amenities or features of a general education school such as libraries,
cafeterias, science labs, music rooms, and playgrounds.52 Overall, the
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶¶ 38–41.
Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶¶ 57–58.
Id. ¶ 48.
Id. ¶ 47.
Id.
Id. ¶ 49.
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complaint alleged that the approximate five thousand students with behaviorrelated disabilities in the Georgia GNETS have been placed in “separate,
segregated and unequal settings, and placed other students at serious risk of
entering such settings, failing to comply with the Americans with Disabilities
Act.”53
As remedies for these alleged violations, the United States sought
numerous types of injunctive relief. First, it requested a declaratory
judgment that the State violated Title II of the Act.54 Second, the U.S. also
sought to enjoin Georgia to both provide integrated mental health and
therapeutic educational services that allow students to be placed in integral
settings and to cease discriminatory practices against students in or entering
the program by placing them in “the most integrated setting appropriate to
the[ir] needs.”55 The position advanced in the complaint was that the most
integrated, appropriate setting would be one in which the students could
interact with, learn alongside, and learn from students without disabilities
and in which they could enjoy access to equal educational materials and
opportunities.56
After months of negotiations and the ultimate failure to come to an
agreement, the United States filed suit against the State of Georgia on August
23, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.57
The lawsuit has been filed under the category of civil rights and the ADA.58
As of late November 2016, the complaint by the Department of Justice was
the only major document that had been filed in the court, but there has also
been an order of recusal of the judge originally assigned the case and various
applications of admission for attorneys that will be appearing for the United
States.59 The State of Georgia has not filed an answer or any documents with
the court at this time.
C. Relevant Law Within the United States
The United States’ complaint alleged the letter of findings and all of
factual allegations stated in the complaint demonstrate the State of Georgia’s
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act through the “unnecessary
53

Press Release, Dep’t of Just. Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Sues Georgia for
Unnecessarily Segregating Students with Disabilities (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-georgia-unnecessarily-segregating-students-disabilities.
54
Complaint, supra note 1, at Prayer for Relief.
55
Id.
56
Id. ¶¶ 44–45.
57
Complaint, supra note 1.
58
Id.
59
Id.
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segregation of persons with disabilities in state programs, services, and
activities.”60
1. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The Americans with Disabilities Act was signed into law on July 26,
1990. The Act is one of the United States’ most comprehensive pieces of
civil rights legislation that protects individuals from discrimination and
ultimately guarantees that people with disabilities have the same
opportunities that other Americans have available to them.
a. Background and Overview
The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits any discrimination based
on disability. In order to be protected by the Act, a person must satisfy three
statutory elements. First, the person must have a disability, a term defined
with respect to an individual person as a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.
Second, there must be a record of such impairment. Third, the person must
be regarded as having an actual or perceived physical or mental
impairment.61 The Act prohibits the covered entities from discriminating
against individuals on the basis of disability in the areas of applications for
employment, hiring procedures, promotions of employees, discharge of
employees, compensation of employees, training of employees, and overall
employment privileges.62 The Act also “prohibits state or local governments,
departments, agencies, or other public entities from denying the benefits of
services, programs, or activities of a public entity.”63
Title I of the Act focuses on employment, specifically the type of
employer, and guidelines for equal employment opportunities and reasonable
accommodation processes.64 Title II of the Act concentrates on public
services of the state and local governments and prohibits discrimination by
“public entities.”65 Title III of the Act is centered on public accommodations
and services that are operated by private entities and prohibits places of
60

See id. ¶ 1; see also GNETS Letter of Findings, supra note 6, at 14.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12133; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345 (2008)).
62
Alonso Diaz, DOJ Sues Georgia for Segregating Students with Disabilities, JURIST.ORG
(Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2016/08/doj-sues-georgia-for-segregating-s
tudents-with-disabilities.php#.V8csor3XaTo.twitter.
63
Id.
64
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (1990).
65
Id. §§ 12131–12165.
61
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public accommodation that are privately owned from discriminating based
on disability and sets minimal accessibility guidelines.66 Title IV of the Act
focuses on telecommunications and requires telephone and internet
companies to provide nationwide services to individuals with speech and
hearing disabilities.67 Title V of the Act is a miscellaneous provision that
relates to issues such as the relationship of the entire Act with other laws and
with a state’s immunity.68
b. Key Provisions
Georgia’s operation of GNETS is alleged to be discriminatory conduct
under Title II of the Act because the state program, a public entity, is the
source of possible discriminatory practices. This Title mandates that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination.”69
A public entity engages in discriminatory practices based on disability when
it engages in any of the following conduct:
(i) Deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity
to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service; (ii)
Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to
participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is
not equal to that afforded others; (iii) Provide a qualified
individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that
is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the
same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level
of achievement as that provided to others; (vii) Otherwise limit
a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any
right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others
receiving the aid, benefit, or service.70
In addition to the requirements that a public entity provide equal aid,
benefit, and services to a qualified person, Title II requires public entities to
provide services in the most integrated setting possible that are suitable to the

66
67
68
69
70

Id. §§ 12181–12189.
Id. § 225.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201–12213 (1990).
Id. § 12131.
28 C.F.R § 35.130(b)(1)(i)–(vii) (1991).
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needs of those individuals with disabilities.71 This aspect of Title II has been
referred to as the “integration clause,” and its meaning was outlined in
United States v. Olmstead, a 1999 Supreme Court decision.72
c. Jurisprudence Interpreting Provisions
The United States Supreme Court case, United States v. Olmstead,
consolidated challenges by two female patients with mental disabilities
regarding the Georgia Regional Hospital’s decision to keep them in
psychiatric isolation.73 The Court was tasked with determining whether
financial constraints of the hospital that prevented it from integrating the two
patients should entirely determine whether states comply with the Act.74 In a
6–3 decision, the Court concluded that the Act required individuals with
mental disabilities be integrated when they have been cleared, expressed a
personal desire, and resources are available to transfer them into integrated
settings.75 The Court recognized that unjustified segregation reflects
judgments that “[i]nstitutional placement of persons who can handle and
benefit from community settings perpetuates unwanted assumptions that
persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community
life” and “institutional confinement severely diminishes individuals’
everyday life activities.”76
In order to comply with the Act’s regulations, the Department of Justice
has stated ways in which Georgia must change its policies, practices, and
procedures. The complaint generally stated that the services and supports
that were currently being provided in the GNETS could be provided in a
more integrated setting, “such as general education classrooms, communitybased settings near schools, and students’ homes.”77 These changes would
fundamentally alter Georgia’s program, and it would allow for the students’
needs to be more appropriately met, taking into account Georgia’s resources
and responsibilities to other students with disabilities throughout the State.78
There has been debate over what is meant by the terms “segregation” and
“discrimination” within the Act, which is discussed in Olmstead through
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.79 Justice Scalia begins his dissent with
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1991).
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 589–90 (1999).
Id. at 581.
Id. at 587.
Id.
Id. at 583.
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 55.
Id. ¶ 59.
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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concerns regarding the misuse of the traditional meanings of the words by
stating that terms such as “segregation were used in the more general sense,
pertaining to matters such as access to employment, facilities, and
transportation” and that without a clear congressional directive in the
alternate it would be improper to assume a different meaning of the terms.80
Next, he argued that based on the canons of construction, the definition used
by the majority in Olmstead was imported from Title I, but because Congress
said “segregation” in one part of the Act and not in Title II, this shows a
purposeful and intentional omission.81
The United States alleged that Georgia GNETS is a violation under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. External norms and international treatment
of individuals with disabilities is relevant and useful in answering the
question of whether Georgia’s GNETS system of educating students with
disabilities away from general education school is discrimination.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW PERTAINING TO CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES
AND THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
This Note focuses on two relevant international treaties that set forth
international norms in the area of discrimination: the 1996 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities.
A. 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
On December 16, 1966, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and the Social and
Political Cultural Rights (CESCR).82 Manfred Nowak in his book, U.N.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary, stated that
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Covenants
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights,
with its two Optional Protocols, . . . form the ‘International Bill of Human
Rights’, the core of human rights protections in the world community.”83

80
81
82
83

Id. at 621.
Id.
NOWAK, supra note 5, at XI.
Id. at XVII.
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1. Background and Overview
In 1993, shortly after the end of the Cold War, the United Nations held
the second World Conference on Human Rights in a period of political
change. The goal of the Conference was to focus on violations of human
rights and the methods that could be implemented to protect these rights.84
The International Bill of Human Rights was formed during this period and is
currently seen as the most influential and “universally recognized minimum
standard” of conduct for states in the area of human rights laws and
procedures.85 The International Covent on Civil and Political Rights came
into force on March 23, 1976; at this point in time, over two-thirds of U.N.
member states have joined as parties.86
The United Nations defines human rights as rights that are “inherent to all
human beings, without distinction as to race, colour, gender, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.”87 Within the category of human rights there are both civil
rights and political rights that are covered by the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Civil rights “guarantee liberal freedom of the individual
from the State” and political rights “guarantee the democratic freedom of
access to the State.”88 Some of the broad and fundamental rights laid out in
the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights are rights to: self-determination;
life; family; participation in the electoral process; due process and a fair trial;
freedom from torture, slavery, genocide; freedoms of speech, expression,
conscience, and religion; and the enjoyment of equal protection of the laws
and to these rights by women, men, children, and minorities.89
2. Compliance Mechanism
States Parties assume various obligations and duties that protect human
rights when they ratify the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
obligation to respect these rights means that the States must not interfere
with these rights, must protect individuals from human rights violations, and
must take action in facilitating the protection of these rights.90
84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 2 ¶ 1.
87
U.N., Frequently Asked Questions, U.N. OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Page
s/FrequentlyAskedQuestions.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
88
NOWAK, supra note 5, at XVII.
89
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4.
90
Frequently Asked Questions, U.N. OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/Fre
quentlyAskedQuestions.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
85
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Under Article 2, “the States Parties commit themselves to respect the
human rights recognized in the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] and
to ensure them without discrimination to all individuals. . . .”91 The State’s
obligations are laid out in Article 2(1) and guarantee that each State assumes
the responsibility of ensuring that all people within their territory are
afforded the protection of all rights laid out in the Covenant.92 This section
is further complemented by Article 2(2), which “requires the States Parties
‘to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to
the rights’ guaranteed in the Covenant whenever such provisions do not
already exist in its domestic law.”93 Under the Covenant there is an
immediate obligation on the State Party to take any and all measures
necessary to ensure that the rights and proclamations contained in the
Covenant are being protected.94
International covenants are treaties. Along with the status of an
international treaty, each covenant creates legally binding obligations the
member states must follow and any noncompliance issues that arise are
subject to international law, not solely domestic law.95 Following ratification
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, domestic law and measures
became the main channel through which human rights are protected and
guaranteed under international law.
In addition to the responsibilities that domestic states are given, each
international covenant has its own enforcement mechanism to ensure that the
States are complying with all of the obligations set forth in the Covenant.
The Human Rights Committee, or Committee, is the monitoring body as set
forth in Part IV Article 28 through Article 45 on Civil and Political Rights.96
Article 28 states that the Committee will be comprised of eighteen members
that are either nominated or elected by the States Parties.97 One of the
enforcement procedures of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is the
91

NOWAK, supra note 5, at XXII.
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 2, ¶ 1.
93
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 51–52
(4th ed. 1988); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, ¶ 2, opened for
signature December 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976).
94
BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 52.
95
Id. at 33.
96
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4.
97
Id. at 179.
92
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monitoring mechanism in Article 40 that allows States Parties to self-report
any factors that are influencing or hindering their ability to implement the
Covenant.98 It is the Committee’s principal purpose to examine all of the
monitoring reports submitted by the States Parties.99 There is no expressed
power conferred to the Committee to conduct investigations into the conduct
of the States Parties after reviewing the reports, but the Committee may
question State Party officials who are required to be present while their
reports are being examined.100 The examination of States Parties’ reports by
an independent, unbiased group of experts in the field has proven to be “an
effective instrument for monitoring domestic implementation measures.”101
3. Status in the United States
In the United States, a treaty will be ratified when the Senate gives it’s
“Advice and Consent” by a two-thirds majority.102 In 1992, the United
States became the one hundred and fifteenth state party to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. There has been and continues to be
debate surrounding the topic of the United States’ ratification of the
Covenant. One scholar at the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Legal
Advisor, David P. Stewart, contended that the ratification of this treaty
marked the United States’ long-standing commitment to the protection of
individual human rights and liberties and to the promotion of these rights

98

The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the
measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein
and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights: (a) Within one
year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the States Parties
concerned; (b) . . . whenever the Committee so requests. . . . All reports shall
be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall
transmit them to the Committee for consideration. Reports shall indicate the
factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation of the present
Covenant. . . . The Secretary-General of the United Nations may . . . transmit
to the specialized agencies . . . copies of … parts of the reports as may fall
within their field of competence. . . . The Committee shall study the
reports. . . . It shall transmit its reports, and such general comments . . . to the
States Parties. The Committee may also transmit to the Economic and Social
Council these comments along with the copies of the reports. . . . The States
Parties to the present Covenant may submit . . . observations on any
comments that may be made in accordance with paragraph 4 of this article.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4.
99
BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 53.
100
Id. at 54.
101
NOWAK, supra note 5, at XIX.
102
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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internationally.103
And additionally, that the ratification marked a
cornerstone in U.S. diplomacy because the Covenant is considered by many
to be the most important human rights treaty in international law and because
the unanimous approval by the U.S. Senate marked a neutralization in “a
persistent thread of hostility in that body and in the American legal
community to ratification of human rights treaties.”104 Another scholar at the
University of Quebec, William A. Schabas, focused on the fact that the
United States’ ratification came accompanied with several reservations and
declarations, two of which aim to exclude the United States from the
Covenant’s scope.105 While this paper focused on the legality of the
reservations, it represents a split among legal scholars on the overarching
meaning and result of the United States’ ratification of the Covenant.
Agreement is seen by William Schabas’s conclusory statement that the
United States’ ratification of the Covenant represented a cornerstone in U.S.
diplomacy because ratification indicated a recognition of contemporary
international human rights law.106
The United States came out of the Second World War as a leader and
advocate “of a treaty-based international system for the protection of human
rights,” but the United States’ policy developed into one of total nonparticipation in international agreements mainly due to the fear of an
emergent “world government.”107 The United States did not ratify any major
international treaty or post-war treaty, even ones that supported international
consensus, on the subject of human rights until 1988 when it ratified the
Genocide Convention.108
When the United States ratified the Covenant, it did so without allowing
the treaty to be self-executing in the United States, which means that the
Covenant provisions cannot be enforced in U.S. courts. Due to the nature of
the ratification process the Executive has developed a system of
“reservations, understanding, and declarations” or RUDs that are designed to
address and overcome any objections the Senate will have to ratification.109
103
David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1183, 1184–85 (1993); BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 412.
104
Stewart, supra note 103, at 1184.
105
William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277, 277 (1995).
106
“The accession to the Covenant, after decades of isolationism, indicated a recognition by
the United States that its previous indifference to contemporary international human rights law
was a source of embarrassment and had become a political liability.” Id. at 324.
107
BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 413.
108
Id. at 416.
109
Id. at 433.
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In effect, these RUDs are modifications to the terms of the treaty as it
pertains to the agreement between the state that made the RUPs and the
states that are accepting the RUDs.110 As Louis Henkin, professor emeritus
at Columbia Law School and chairman of the Center for the Study of Human
Rights at Columbia University, noted, there are five main categories that are
attached to human rights treaties: first, the United States will not undertake
any treaty that is inconsistent with the United States Constitution; second, the
United States adherence to an international human rights treaty should not
affect—or promise—change in existing U.S. law or practice; third, the
United States will be subject to jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice to decide disputes as to the interpretation or application of human
rights conventions; fourth, every human rights treaty to which the United
States adheres should be subject to a “federalism clause”; fifth, every
international human rights agreement should be “non-self-executing.”111
All nation-states that ratify the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are
allowed to attach various reservations to their agreement to ratify, but the
United States’ attachment of multiple RUDs to human rights treaties has
brought great criticism.112 The non-self-executing RUDs have received the
greatest criticism because of the large impacts that this provision has on a
State’s obligations under the treaty. The United States’ non-self-executing
mechanisms effectually precluded a U.S. citizen from filing petitions
charging the State with violations of their rights under the Covenant in U.S.
Courts.113 Critics of this provision have argued that this decision “effectively
nullifies the treaty as a legal instrument that defined U.S. government’s
obligations to its citizens.”114 Along with the practical criticism, there has
been a policy criticism that the decision not to adopt the self-executing
provision is another way that the United States is avoiding external criticism
from foreign states and maintaining the face of the strongest state in the
international realm.115

110

Id.
Penny M. Venetis, Making Human Rights Treaty Law Actionable in the United States:
The Case for Universal Implementing Legislation, 63 ALA. L. REV. 97, 105 (2011).
112
Id. at 104.
113
Id. at 107.
114
See id.; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 695, 700 (1995) (“The doctrine of self-execution is a long-standing but confusing
judicial doctrine created many decades ago.”).
115
Venetis, supra note 111, at 109 (quoting Professor Henkin, “the reservation designed to
deny international obligations serve to immunize the United States from external judgment, the
declaration that a convention shall be non-self-executing is designed to keep its own judges from
judging the human rights conditions in the United States by international standards”).
111
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a. Charming Betsy Canon of Statutory Construction
The extent to which intentional law or customary international practices
and principles apply to the United States has always been a topic of debate.
This discussion comes up in the context of whether it is appropriate for U.S.
domestic courts to look at international norms in their decision-making
process or whether international and foreign law may be cited as a reference
point in domestic cases. Using international law and international norms as
an interpretive tool has been a tradition of U.S. law for a large part of the
nation’s history and this is referred to as the Charming Betsy canon.116
The Charming Betsy canon of interpretation comes from the 1804
Supreme Court case Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy where the Court
held that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”117 The case
presented the issue of whether the Charming Betsy ship was subject to
seizure and condemnation for violating a law of the United States.118 Since
the Charming Betsy case, this canon has become an important part of the
U.S.’s legal relationship with international law.119 According to Curtis A.
Bradley, Duke University School of Law Professor of Public Policy Studies,
one conception of this canon is that it is grounded in separation of powers
concerns, and stand for the proposition that unless Congress specifically
states its intent to violate international norms, the U.S. courts will not
interpret legislation in a way that will place the United States in violation of
international law.120
The Charming Betsy canon of interpretation is particularly useful when
the terms of legislation are either ambiguous or absent. Curtis A. Bradley
quoted Phillip R. Trimble who stated: “[W]hen actual congressional intent is
ambiguous or absent, applying the Charming Betsy canon is the same as
creating a rule that the government regulatory scheme cannot violate
international law.”121 This principle and means of interpretation are relevant
to the discussion of the Americans with Disabilities Act because of the
ambiguities in the key terms—segregation and discrimination—used

116

Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 482 (1998).
117
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
118
Id. at 118.
119
Bradley, supra note 116, at 482; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
120
Bradley, supra note 116, at 526.
121
Id. at 483 (quoting Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International
Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 675 (1986)).
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throughout the Act that are unclear due to the different definitions and
applications of each term.
b. Use of External Legal Norms as Aids of Interpretation
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a cause of
action for Georgia’s GNETS programs that is separate from the current civil
action United States v. Georgia will not be created. Even though a separate
cause of action will not stand, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is
still relevant to interpret key statutory or constitutional provisions. It is not
necessary that a relevant norm govern a situation, but the fact that the norm
is relevant deems it worth considering.122
There are various viewpoints that address the issue of whether or not the
Covenant, or any legal treaty that the United States is a party to, has any
legal effect on the State. One understanding is based in Article VI of the
United States Constitution that states, “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States . . . and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land. . . .”123 This view asserts that treaties that have been ratified become
domestic law that hold the same normative rank as the U.S. Constitution as
long as it does not conflict with constitutional provisions and that treaty law
may triumph federal and state law.124 Another view is based on precedent of
the United States Supreme Court where the Court has rejected claims under
the Covenant without consideration of the merits due to RUD conditions that
have been attached to the ratification of international treaties, which
precludes the Covenant from being a source of international law.125 The
position of the Covenant, and international law in general, stands at a middle
ground of authority and has been disputed in various federal and state court
cases. The non-self-executing RUDs have precluded American courts from
treating international treaty law as a source of domestic law, but at the same
time American courts are expected to give effect to the treaty law. The
United States as a whole is expected to uphold the obligations of the
Covenant.126

122
Diane Marie Amann, “Raise the Flag and Let it Talk”: On the Use of External Norms in
Constitutional Decision Making, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 597, 609 (2004).
123
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
124
BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 418.
125
Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1
CHI. J. INT’L L. 327, 329 (2000).
126
Venetis, supra note 111, at 107; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(3) (AM. LAW INST. XXXX).
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The United States has often been seen as isolationist in its general
approach of not considering external legal norms and practices when making
internal decisions. In 2003, two landmark Supreme Court decisions,
Lawrence v. Texas and Gratz v. Bollinger, marked an era of change with the
United States moving away from isolationism and towards the use of
external norms.127 Both of these cases overruled the Court’s prior
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.128 Diane Marie Amann, Faculty CoDirector of the Dean Rusk International Law Center, stated that the 2003
judgements of the Supreme Court marked the “Court’s willingness to look
beyond U.S. borders when circumstances warrant” and shared that external
norms are relevant for internal matters to the degree that they “resonate with
American values and American experience.”129 The Court’s decision to seek
guidance from external norms has not been consistent. As Amann stated,
every member of the Court has become more receptive of consulting external
norms, but the Court’s consultation of external norms has been selective and
“unbounded by any coherent criteria.”130 External norms are relevant to
internal matters. Therefore, the question becomes under what circumstances
an external norm will be relevant.131 Courts are national institutions, so they
are subject to the continued globalization of human activities and, thus, the
courts too must adapt to external norms.132
According to Amann, the label of “comparable legal standards” as a
criterion for referencing an “external” norm is a misnomer, because the
external norms the United States Supreme Court has looked to matter by
virtue of their link to an internal norm.133 Thus, the external norms the Court
has looked at are norms currently held by the Court. The reference then
comes in as a means of persuasive authority by the Court looking at the ways
that external bodies treat a particular norm.134 Following World War II,
liberty and equality norms dominated.135 The United States endorsed these
norms when it ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.136 The provisions and terms of the Covenant promote values held by
the United States.137 Consulting external norms is not seeking guidance from
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Amann, supra note 122, at 597.
Id.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 605.
Id.
Id. at 606.
Id.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id.
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a different value system; rather, it is “finding internal resonance with
practices that are labeled external.”138 A court is free to apply or disregard a
relevant external norm, but that decision has no bearing on whether or not
the norm is in fact relevant.139
4. Key Provisions
The League of Nations formed the Committee for the Protection of
Children in 1919 and adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child in
1924.140 The intention of these treaties was not to create a binding set of
domestic laws but to set up a body of guiding principles for States to look to
when formulating their own domestic law.141
In addition to its role as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
enforcer, the Human Rights Committee functions as a body that interprets
the Covenant’s provisions. Throughout the years, the Committee has
adopted nearly three dozen General Comments designed to present guidance
to States Parties in discharging their obligations under the Covenant.142
These General Comments do not create binding international law, but under
Article 40(4)143 of the Covenant, these are generally complied with and
“considered to be the most authoritative interpretation of the Covenant’s
provisions.”144 General Comments created by the Human Rights Committee
are comparable to a judicial body that interprets the Covenant’s provisions
with such authority that the comments are relied upon when evaluating
whether or not a State Party has complied with the Covenant’s obligations in
examining the state reports or in private citizen adjudication.145

138
Id. at 608–09 (citing LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 322 (Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1996) (“Recognizing that the United States has
promoted and embraced international human rights standards deriving from ours, Justices
might yet conclude that a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that we look to
international standards to illuminate our constitutional values of liberty, equality, property.”)).
139
Id. at 609.
140
TREVOR BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAW 21 (3d ed. 2014).
141
Id. at 22.
142
See BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 59.
143
The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States Parties to the
present Covenant. It shall transmit its reports, and such general comments as
it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties. The Committee may also
transmit to the Economic and Social Council these comments along with the
copies of the reports it has received from States Parties to the present
Covenant.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 2 ¶ 1.
144
Id.; see also NOWAK, supra note 5, at XIX.
145
BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 59.
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There are various relevant provisions in the Covenant that address the
issue of whether the State of Georgia’s operation of the GNETS, exhibits
segregation or is discriminatory in nature.
a. Article 24: Non-Discriminatory Protection of the Child
i. Text of Article 24
Article 24 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights sets out the
“rights of the child,” and states:
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race,
colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin,
property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are
required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family,
society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.146
This section does not set forth any specific rights to the child, nor does it
guarantee general applicability of all Covenant provisions to the child.
Instead, ratifying states pledge to uphold this provision by taking steps to
ensure the child is protected either by family, other means of a support
system, or through the Covenant’s own functions.147 These protections
include minimum norms for civil processes, e.g., regulation between parents
and children; laws of custody; norms of heritage and guardianship; and
special criminal law treatment—including minimum standards for harming a
child, establishment of an age for criminal liability, and standards of criminal
treatment for juveniles.148 Additionally, there are protections to ensure the
child has proper nutrition, housing, recreation, medical care, security, and
education.149 Article 24 also prohibits discrimination based on any of these
categories; this provision is violated when a child does not receive the
protection she is entitled to or “receives less protection than other
children.”150

146
147
148
149
150

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 24.
NOWAK, supra note 5, at 424.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 425–26.
Id. at 427.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

5/11/2018 5:45 PM

2018] SEGREGATION OF GEORGIA SCHOOLCHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 739

ii. Jurisprudence Interpreting Article 24: General Comment No.
17 (Rights of the Child)
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 17, issued in
1989, addressed the rights of the child provided in Article 24 of the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.151 General Comment 17 discusses the special
rights and protections given to children under the Covenant solely based on
their status as minors.152 The particular age that a person receives child
status under the Covenant is left to the State Party to determine based on
social and cultural norms, but the Covenant specifies that a State Party
cannot absolve itself of providing these protections for persons under the age
of eighteen.153
The Comment sets forth certain procedures that are necessary to provide
special protection to children, but the majority of procedural decisions are
left to the States to determine based on the specific needs within their
jurisdiction.154 The Comment specifically addresses the issue of education
by stating that with respect to children: “In the cultural field, every possible
measure should be taken to foster the development of their personality and to
provide them with a level of education that will enable them to enjoy the
rights recognized in the Covenant, particularly the right to freedom of
opinion and expression.”155 The Comment characterizes Article 24 as
affording every child, without discrimination on any basis, the stated
procedures and unstated procedures that are necessary to protect the child
and foster the child’s development solely on the basis that the person is
afforded the special child status protections.156
b. Article 26: Rights to Equal Protection
Another applicable provision in the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
is Article 26 which lists the rights under the Covenant that are necessary in
order for there to be equality.

151

U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 17: Article 24
(Rights of the Child) (Apr. 7, 1989), http://www.refworld.org/docid/45139b464.html.
152
Id. at 1–2.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 1.
155
Id.
156
Id.
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i. Text of Article 26
Article 26 states that all persons are equal and entitled to equal protection
of the law.157 Additionally, Article 26 states the law shall guarantee all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”158 Historically,
Article 26 developed out of a general consensus that equality stood as the
foundation of human rights law.159 Within Article 26 there are various
protections that relate to equality that have been discussed in detail due to
proposed amendments and their surrounding debates.
Article 26 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affords three
different protections to the persons within States Parties that form the
Article’s independent right to equality: the right to equal protection of the
law, the right to the prohibition of discrimination, and the right to protection
against discrimination.160 The right to equality before the law is not directed
at the legislature, but at judges and government officials to ensure that the
law is applied and enforced equally with regard to all individuals. These
principle states that different treatment of individuals must be based on
objective factors; the factors are not exclusively the characteristics listed in
the second sentence of Article 26.161 The Article guarantees the equal
protection of the law in the first sentence, then in the second sentence of the
Article sets forth the negative and positive prohibitions and protections that
the national legislatures must accomplish in order to provide that
protection.162 This interpretation comes from the connector words that start
the second sentence, “[i]n this respect,” and while this phrase was originally
intended to only apply to equality before the law, the extended meaning was
given through the adoption of the Indian amendment.163 Through Article 26,
States Parties have an obligation to ensure that their legislation provides
substantive equality to all persons in their jurisdiction, and courts have

157

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 26.
Id.
159
See NOWAK, supra note 5, at 458 (stating that “[a]long with liberty, equality is the most
important principle imbuing and inspiring the concept of human rights”).
160
Id. at 469.
161
Id. at 466–67.
162
Id. at 468.
163
Id. (citing VIERDAG, THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1973)
(THE HAGUE) (“The Indian delegate rejected this addition with the argument that these are two
different concepts of equality and that equal protection of the law does not result from equality
before the law.”)).
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looked to the meaning of discrimination to determine whether or not this has
been accomplished.164
ii. Jurisprudence Interpreting Article 26: General Comment No.
18 (Non-Discrimination)
The Committee’s General Comment 18, issued in 1989, discusses the
non-discrimination provision set forth in Article 26 of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.165 Article 26 not only entitles all persons to equality
before the law and equal protection of the law but also prohibits any
discrimination under the law and guarantees all persons protection against
discrimination on grounds such as “race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.”166 This listed criteria, or categories of discrimination, has been
chosen because these characteristics are seen as particularly problematic as a
basis for distinction due to the fact that these are inherent personal
characteristics that cannot be changed by the person and have been subject to
a history of negative treatment.167
The Human Rights Committee states that the Covenant has not
specifically defined the term discrimination and has not detailed what
constitutes discrimination. Instead, the Covenant lists personal characteristics
that indicate discrimination when used as the basis for determining whether a
person may receive a benefit, aid, or services.168 By looking at the ways
other antidiscrimination has been defined, the Human Rights Committee
stated that in its view the term as used on the Covenant shall mean:
to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,

164

Id. at 469.
U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 18: Article 26
(Non-Discrimination) (Nov. 10, 1989) U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), http://ccprcentre.
org/page/view/general_comments/27792.
166
Id. ¶ 1.
167
See NOWAK, supra note 5, at 44, 474 (discussing the Committee’s interpretation of
impermissible grounds for distinction under Article 2(1) of the Covenant).
168
U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), supra note 165, ¶ 6.
165
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enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all
rights and freedoms.169
Further, General Comment 18 said that there may be times when affirmative
action, or specific action to correct discriminatory conditions, is needed to
combat conditions that “cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited
by the Covenant.”170 The Committee indicated that if the general conditions
of a subset of the population limits or prevents those individuals from
enjoying the human rights they are afforded, then it may be necessary for the
State Party to implement special or preferential treatment for that group.171
This is considered to be legitimate differentiation under the Covenant’s terms
because it is needed to remedy the discrimination that is occurring.172
Article 2 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides
protection against discrimination, limited to those provisions specifically set
forth in the Covenant; whereas, Article 26 is not limited in that way and
provides protection against discrimination and the right to equality on any
enumerated grounds.173 The Committee stated that this is a separate and
more expansive right from the one stated in Article 2 and that Article 26
prohibits all “discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and
protected by the public authorities.”174 States Parties’ current legislation and
enforcement of legislation must comply with the non-discrimination
obligation under Article 26, which applies to more than those rights stated in
the Covenant.175
In evaluating whether there has been a discrimination violation under
Article 26, the Human Rights Committee stated that differentiation of
treatment is not discrimination when “the criteria for such differentiation are
reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is
legitimate under the Covenant.”176 The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights uses the word “discrimination,” not “distinction.”177 Manfred Nowak
asserted that this choice was made to allow distinctions when they are
justified but not allow invalid distinctions based on “unfavourable and
odious distinctions which lacked any objective or reasonable basis.”178
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13.
NOWAK, supra note 5, at 473 n.76.
Id.
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Therefore, an invalid “distinction” is “discrimination” only when it is not
based on reasonable and objective criteria.179 The conclusion as to whether a
distinction is in fact “discrimination” is based on all of the surrounding,
relevant circumstances, evaluated on a case-by-case basis.180 According to
Manfred Nowak, discrimination will be found “when the parties concerned
find themselves in a comparable situation and when the distinction is based
on unreasonable and subjective criteria.”181
B. 2007 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was adopted
by the United Nations in 2006, and it went into effect in May 2008.182 The
Convention represented the development of international law in which the
international community sought to create effective responses to abuses of
persons with disabilities.183 While the United States has signed but not yet
ratified this treaty, certain provisions of the treaty are useful to amplify an
understanding of what constitutes impermissible discrimination against
children under the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. The Covenant
provided characteristics of the persons to be protected from discrimination,
and it expanded on the conduct that constitutes discrimination of students
with disabilities. The Convention provides a better understanding of
international law’s position on what constitutes discrimination in schools
against students with disabilities, which may in turn aid the interpretation of
relevant U.S. law.
1. Background, Overview, and Compliance Mechanism
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities targets the
discrimination against persons with disabilities and aims to guarantee those
persons the exercise of basic human rights.184 The Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, like the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
has a body of experts that monitor the implementation of the Convention by

179

Id. at 473.
Id.
181
Id. at 473–74.
182
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3,
http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/convention/convoptprot-e.pdf.
183
PENELOPE WELLER, NEW LAW AND ETHICS IN MENTAL HEALTH ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 18
(Routledge 2013) (citing Don MacKay, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 323, 323–31 (2007)).
184
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 182, art. 1.
180
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State Parties.185 The Optional Protocol of the Convention gives the body of
experts the ability to examine individual complaints with regards to alleged
violations.186 Further, like the Covenant, the Convention’s body of eighteen
independent experts interpret the Convention’s articles in the form of general
comments.
The United States has not yet chosen to ratify this Convention, and
therefore, the obligations are not applicable to the United States.
Nevertheless, the Convention can be used to inform the broader meaning and
understanding of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because of the
fuller discussion and focus of the Convention on persons with disabilities.
2. Key Provisions
There are two main articles in the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities: Article 2 provides a definition of discrimination on the
basis of disability and Article 24 details the rights to inclusive education.187
a. Article 2: Definition of “Discrimination on the Basis of Disability”
The Convention focuses solely on disability with many of the terms
discussed in the Covenant defined in the Convention in the context of
disability.
i. Text of Article 2
The Convention requires that measures be implemented without
discrimination on the basis of disability.188 Article 2 of the Convention sets
out definitions for the Convention:
For the purposes of the present Convention: . . .
“Discrimination on the basis of disability” means any
distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability
which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with
others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It

185
186
187
188

BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 114.
Id.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 182, arts. 2, 24.
Id. art. 2.
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includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of
reasonable accommodation. . . .189
Article 2 further defines reasonable accommodation as the
[N]ecessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not
imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in
a particular case, to ensure persons with disabilities the
enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms.190
The definition of discrimination and reasonable accommodation are both
applicable to further understanding the terms used in Article 24 of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which sets forth non-discriminatory
protection of the child.
b. Article 24: Right to Inclusive Education
Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
discusses the rights of persons with disabilities to inclusive education.
i. Text of Article 24
The relevant portions of this Article set out the necessary requirements to
ensure that students with disabilities are being educated in a nondiscriminatory manner. First, Article 24 paragraph 1 states that persons with
disabilities have the right to education free from discrimination and on the
basis of equal opportunity ensured through inclusive education directed to:
(a) The full development of human potential and sense of
dignity and self-worth, and the strengthening of respect for
human rights, fundamental freedoms and human diversity;
(b) The development by persons with disabilities of their
personality, talents and creativity, as well as their mental and
physical abilities, to their fullest potential;
(c) Enabling persons with disabilities to participate effectively
in a free society.191

189
190
191

Id.
Id.
Id. art. 24 ¶ 1.
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Next, Article 24, paragraph 2 of the Convention states that persons with
disabilities should not be excluded from the general education system on the
basis of disability and have access to an inclusive, quality education on an
equal basis with others; persons with disabilities should receive the support
required, within the general education system that facilitates their effective
education consistent with the goal of inclusion.192
Finally, Article 24, paragraph 4 of the Convention states that States
Parties should take appropriate measures to employ teachers and staff at all
levels of education and train them in a way that incorporates disability
awareness and the use of appropriate augmentative and alternative modes,
means, and formats of communication, educational techniques, and materials
to support persons with disabilities.193
ii. Jurisprudence: General Comment No. 4 (Right to Inclusive
Education)
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was the first
legally binding instrument that contained a reference to the concept of
quality inclusive education.194 The Convention’s General Comment No. 4
asserted that, according to their own study, inclusive education is the only
way that persons with disabilities can be educated equally, both in terms of
the quality of education and in a way that provides necessary social
developments.195 Inclusive education is defined as:
Inclusion involves a process of systemic reform embodying
changes and modifications in content, teaching methods,
approaches, structures and strategies in education to overcome
barriers with a vision serving to provide all students of the
relevant age range with an equitable and participatory learning
experience and environment that best corresponds to their
requirements and preferences.196

192

Id. art. 24 ¶ 2.
Id. art. 24 ¶ 4.
194
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), CRDP General Comment
No. 4: Article 24 (Right to Inclusive Education), (Sept. 2, 2016), U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/GC/4,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/GC.aspx (follow “Article 24: Right to
Inclusive Education” hyperlink; then follow “English PDF” hyperlink) [hereinafter CRDP
General Comment No 4: Article 24].
195
Id. ¶ 2.
196
Id. ¶ 11.
193
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According to General Comment 4, inclusive education is required under
Article 24, paragraph 1 of the Convention in all levels of education and
extracurricular and social activities associated with schools.197 Integrating
disabled students into the general education schools does not automatically
transition education from segregation to inclusion; instead, inclusive
education involves a “whole systems” approach that considers a whole
educational environment and the whole person, along with supported
teachers, respect for and value of diversity, learning-friendly environment,
effective transitions, recognition for partnerships, and monitoring on a
continued basis.198
Article 24, paragraph 1(a) reiterates the aims of education that must be
focused on the full development of the human potential, including the sense
of dignity and self-worth, which prohibits the exclusion of persons with
disabilities from the general education system.199 Article 24, paragraph 1(b)
states that the education of persons with disabilities should not be in the form
of a deficit approach—one focused on actual or perceived impairments—
instead, education should be focused on the development of personality,
talents, and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential.200 In order
to achieve this, the education system must comprise four interrelated criteria:
first, availability of sufficient programs in public and private schools;
second, accessible buildings, information, and communication; third,
acceptability of all requirements, cultures, and languages; fourth, adaptable
learning environments provided by teachers and other staff.201 Article 24,
paragraph 1(c) asserts the aims of education must be to enable persons with
disabilities to fully participate in a free society.202
Article 24, paragraph 2 requires the States Parties to provide reasonable
accommodations for disabled students that enable them to access education
on an equal basis with others.203 This section affirms that disabled students
are entitled to individualized support that is necessary to facilitate their
effective education, including availability of services and sufficiently trained
teaching staff, psychologists, and other relevant professionals.204 These
measures must be implemented with the goal of inclusion and in a manner

197
198
199
200
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Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶¶ 20–22, 25–26.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 32.
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that strengthens the opportunities for students with disabilities to participate
in the classroom and in out-of-school activities alongside their peers.205
Article 24, paragraph 4 requires that States Parties take measures to
employ administrative, teaching, and other staff with skills necessary to work
effectively with disabled students in inclusive environments.206 A school
must have an appropriate number of qualified professionals to work with
disabled students to maintain effective inclusive education environments.207
The Convention’s detailed explanation of the terms and procedures
necessary to ensure students with disabilities are not being discriminated
against in the education system is useful in analyzing whether the State of
Georgia GNETS programs are currently being conducted in a discriminatory
manner under the Covenant because of the similarity in terms and goals.
IV. EXISTENCE AND EXTENT OF VIOLATION
A. Is There a Violation Under International Law?
The propriety of Georgia’s use of GNETS is a close case under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, but the manner in which GNETS has been
administered is a clear violation based on intentional law standards. GNETS
is a violation of Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights because GNETS students do not receive a quality of
education equal to that of students in general education schools in multiple
facets, and because the environment of education segregates GNETS
students away from general education schools and activities.
B. Equality Violation Under Article 26 of the ICCPR
Article 26 provides three distinct rights to which persons within States
Parties to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are entitled: the right to
equal protection of the law, the right to prohibition of discrimination, and the
right to protection against discrimination.208 The issue here is not whether a
specific law in the United States is being administered in an unequal manner;
rather, the issue is whether GNETS is being administered in a discriminatory
manner. In reaching a conclusion on the issue, this Note will look: first, at
the basis for distinction between students who are in the GNETS Programs;
second, at whether the separation is based on reasonable and objective
205
206
207
208

Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 36.
Id.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 26.
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criteria; third, at whether there is a legitimate purpose to the distinction under
the Covenant; and fourth, at whether there is equality or discrimination
between GNETS students and general education school students.
First, the separation of GNETS students from general education schools is
based on a student having one or more severe characteristics that are
indicative of an emotional or behavioral disability.209 Article 26 lists a
number of inherent, personal characteristics that are immediately suspect
when a person is classified based on them. These inherent qualities include
traits like race, gender, religion, and “other status.”210 The decision to
include the last term “other status” indicates the Covenant’s goal of
protecting discrimination on any grounds that is an inherent trait and to
dissuade the interpretation that protections are only afforded to the specific
enumerations listed. The status of a person with an emotional or behavioral
disability falls into the category of “other status,” and is therefore protected
by Article 26, the Covenant’s Equality provision.
Second, Article 26 has been interpreted as requiring that the
differentiation be based on reasonable and objective criteria.211 In this case,
the decision to place a student into the GNETS Program begins with a
referral from general education school for an evaluation. The evaluation is
later conducted by referencing the State Party’s criteria for entry and exit
standards. Much of this process of evaluation looks at the severity,
frequency, and duration of the disorder.212 The ultimate decision of
placement is made by the student’s local school based on these three types of
manifestations of the disability that have been documented.213 There is no
further information, criteria, or descriptions of what makes a student eligible
for the GNETS Program; this decision appears to be a subjective decision by
the local school team members after there has been a referral from the
general school. The local school considers objective criteria in making the
decision of whether a student should be placed into GNETS, but the overall
process of making that decision does not appear to be sufficiently objective
or reasonable as required by the Covenant.
Third, Article 26 inquires into whether the purpose of the distinction is
legitimate under the Covenant.214 The asserted purpose of the separation of
209

Complaint, supra note 1.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 26.
211
CCPR General Comment No. 18: Article 26, supra note 165, at 3.
212
See Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. § 160-4-7-.15(2) (2007), http://rules.sos.state.ga.us/gac/160-47; Ga. Dep’t of Ed., GNETS Operations Manual at 9, 11–12 (Jan. 2014) (the “GNETS
Operations Manual”), http://www.gadoe.org/Cur riculum-Instruction-and-Assessment/SpecialEducation-Services/Documents/GNETS/FY14% 20Operations%20Manual.pdf.
213
Id. at 13.
214
CCPR General Comment No. 18: Article 26 (Non-Discrimination), supra note 165, at 3.
210
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GNETS students from places of general education is to provide them with
In
comprehensive educational and therapeutic support services.215
connection with this purpose, the goal is to provide students with services in
a public setting instead of in a residential or more restrictive placement.
Providing students with behavioral and emotional disabilities the level of
attention and programs they need to learn is certainly a legitimate purpose.
The factual allegations suggest that the manner in which GNETS is currently
being conducted does not achieve this goal.
Finally, even when there are arguably objective criteria and a legitimate
purpose, Article 26 will still be violated if the means of achieving that
purpose are not appropriately suited. GNETS is a violation of this provision
and is discriminatory not because the students are being separated but for the
following two reasons: first, GNETS students do not have access to a wide
range of activities and resources making their education unequal; second,
GNETS students are not being afforded the opportunity to be educated in an
integrated setting because of the lack of resources allocated by the State to
ensure this opportunity.
The GNETS Program is not equal to general education schools because of
the lack of opportunities to take elective subjects, the exclusion from extracurricular activities, the lack of subject certified teachers, and the reliance on
computer based teaching.216 First, GNETS Program students are not given
the opportunity to participate in elective classes like art, foreign language,
and vocational course that the students in general education schools are
exposed to.217 The lack of exposure to electives keeps GNETS students from
being as well-rounded in their education and skill sets as their general
education peers.
Second, GNETS Program students are not allowed to participate in the
extra-curricular activities that take place at their home school, nor do they
have extra-curricular activities of their own.218 The Convention General
Comment No. 4 focused on the fact that the aim of education should be on
the full development of students, which is a goal that cannot be achieved
when students with disabilities are excluded from the general education
system and activities.219 Extra-curricular activities include attending sports
games, dances, and other social events that commonly take place at schools.
215

See § 160-4-7-.15(2); Ga. Dep’t of Ed., GNETS Operations Manual at 5, 11–12 (Jan. 2014)
(the “GNETS Operations Manual”), http://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-Instruction-and-Assessm
ent/Special-Education-Services/Documents/GNETS/FY14%20Operations%20Manual.pdf.
216
GNETS Letter of Findings, supra note 6, at 15.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
CRDP General Comment No. 4: Article 24, supra note 194, ¶ 2.
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The lack of inclusion in the activities at their home schools necessarily leads
GNETS students to have feelings of inferiority, exclusion, and differentness.
Also, these activities further the development of social and emotional
education. Learning to work together on a school team or being focused on
an activity are practical skills that general education schools foster through
these types of activities that the GNETS students will not be exposed to.
Third, the overall quality of education in GNETS programs is generally
not equal to the education in general education schools. For most of the
GNETS programs, the students are taught through computer based
programs.220 The attention and education that is facilitated by a physical
teacher in a classroom is not comparable to learning from a computer screen.
Many GNETS facilities are in poor physical condition and most lack
additional extra-curricular facilities like libraries, playgrounds, and science
labs.221 Under Article 26, this excludes the GNETS students from enjoying
human rights, specifically the right to a quality education that is comparable
to general education students, that they are entitled to receive.222
The separation and distinction of students due to a behavioral or
emotional disability alone would not provide for a violation under Article 26,
but the GNETS programs are not equal to general education programs. The
unequal conditions and education in the GNETS programs fits within the
Convention’s definition of discrimination because it is an exclusion on the
basis of disability that has the effect of impairing the exercise of a right that
is on an equal basis with others.223 These students are not being allowed to
reach their full mental, physical, or creative potential due to the differences
in education.
GNETS programs have not allowed students that are willing and able to
be integrated into general education schools. Once students are placed into
the GNETS programs they are completely isolated and segregated from their
peers. Many of the GNETS programs are located in separate buildings that
are at different locations than general education schools, and even when
programs are on the same campus, they are located in basements or separate
wings of the school.224 There is not any interaction between the two groups
of students. After a student has been placed into the GNETS program it is
difficult for them to return to general education school due to the strict exit
criteria. It is easy for a school to send students that become a behavioral

220
221
222
223
224

Id. ¶ 56.
Id. ¶ 58.
CCPR General Comment No. 18: Article 26, supra note 165, ¶ 1.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 182, art. 2.
GNETS Letter of Findings, supra note 6, at 9.
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disruption in the classroom away, and there is little incentive to
accommodate those students in the general classroom.
The lack of integration or efforts to integrate is a violation under Article
26, because the Covenant requires that affirmative steps be taken in order to
combat conditions that “cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited
by the Covenant.”225 The Human Rights Committee suggested that when
certain groups are discriminated against, it may be legitimate to treat those
groups with preferential treatment to remedy the discrimination.226 The
Convention expands on this proposition by stating that students with
disabilities should be educated in the general education schools as long as
they are willing and that specialty teachers and conditions should be included
in the general classrooms that facilitate the inclusion.227 The GNETS are
discriminatory because it does not attempt to integrate the students in any
manner.
C. The Limits and Scope on Enforceability
The scope of enforceability of Article 26 of the Covenant will be limited
in scope by the United States’ decision not to implement non-self-executing
RUDs upon ratification of the Covenant, which precludes a person from
bringing a cause of action under the Covenant’s provisions in the United
States. More importantly, when the United States ratified the Covenant it did
so with a series of “reservations, understandings, and declarations” that limit
the applicability of certain obligations in the Covenant to the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
In the end, the goal of the lawsuit in United States v Georgia is to force
the State of Georgia to bring its educational systems for students with
disabilities into compliance with the ADA. The goal and stated purpose of
the GNETS Program, to provide students with disabilities the therapeutic
services that they need, is a legitimate and admirable purpose, but the
manner in which the program is currently functioning does not meet that
purpose. Instead, students with disabilities are being segregated and
educated in a way that is unequal to students in general education. The
inequality of electives, extra-curricular classes, access to resources and
teachers, and the lack of efforts to integrate the students who could be

225
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CCPR General Comment No. 18: Article 26, supra note 165, ¶ 10.
Id.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 182, art. 24.
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integrated arguably makes the GNETS Program a violation of the ADA and
also a violation of international human rights law.
There are a number of manners in which the State of Georgia could
remedy this problem. The DOJ listed a few changes that the State could
make in order to comply with the ADA. The two suggestions focus on
equality and integration. First, the State should make all efforts necessary to
provide integrated and therapeutic mental health services that will allow
students to be placed in more integrated settings.228 The level of integration
should be specific to each individual student, but it is necessary that the State
takes affirmative steps to integrate GNETS students in a way that best suits
the educational needs of those students. Second, the State should stop
discrimination practices against the students currently in or entering the
GNETS program.229 Since certain students may be able to focus and learn
more efficiently in a segregated setting, it is necessary for the State to ensure
that all of the class and extra-curricular opportunities, resources, and
environments are equal to what is being provided to general education
students. Further, appropriate steps should be taken to guarantee that
teachers and staff members that are certified in the subject area and methods
of teaching students with behavioral and emotional disabilities are placed in
the integrated and separated educational settings. Educators should be
trained in ways that incorporates disability awareness and the appropriate
educational techniques and formats of communication that are effective to
support persons with disabilities.230
The national and state governments are in the best position to ensure that
the country’s children with disabilities are not being discriminated against,
and this begins with educating them equally and in a manner that will foster
their development to reach their full potential. The current GNETS schools
in Georgia does not adequately meet this goal. The administration of the
GNETS program does not meet the standard of international human rights
law. The current problem and lack of compliance by the State demonstrated
the need for a civil suit to be initiated. In determining whether or not
Georgia’s conduct is acceptable it is important to view the issue against the
backdrop of international standards.
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